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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PATRICIA JO MORLEY, JANICE LEE
MORLEY, by and through MAX L.
MORLEY, their guardian a:d litem, and
ELISA RUTH LEON, by and through
ALFRED LEON, her guardian a:d litem,
Plaintiffs,

Case
No. 8738

vs.
ELBERTEEN RODBERG,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the record.)
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On September 14, 1956, Harold B. Kesler, doing business
as Kesler's Auto Repair, was driving a 1947 Pontiac automobile
west on Burton Avenue in South Salt Lake City. He was accompanied by the owner, Elberteen Rodberg. Three infant children, Patricia Jo Morley, age 3, Janice Lee Morley, age 2, and
Elisa Ruth Leon, age 3, walked out onto the public street and
were struck and injured by the automobile which Kesler was
driving. The plaintiffs, through their fathers as guardians ad
litem, sued both Kesler and Mrs. Rodberg. The suit was brought
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against Kesler on the theory that he was making a roadtest at
the direction of Mrs. Rodberg, and was her agent or servant, and
against Mrs. Rodberg on the theory that she was the principal
herein and on the theory that the brakes on Mrs. Rodberg's
automobi'le were in a defective condition, which she knew or
should have known.
The allegations of Principal and Agent and negligence were
denied by both Defendants.
The jury returned a ver·dict in favor of the Defendant Mrs.
Rodberg and against the three plaintiffs.
The jury did find for the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant Kesler in the total amount of $6,523.45.
This appeal is taken by the three plaintiffs upon the grounds
that Kesler, the driver, was negligent, and that he was the agent
and servant of the owner Rodberg as a matter of law and claims
error in submitting the question of agency to the jury. Plaintiffs
also contend that Mrs. Rodberg, because of the alleged condition
of the brakes on her automobile, was negligent as a matter of
law and Plaintiffs also contend that the court erroneously gave
certain instructions and refused to give others.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This accident occurred at approximately 5:30 p.m. in the
public street in front of 227 East Bmton Avenue when the westbound Pontiac automobile, driven h~- Kesler, and accompanied
by Mrs. Rodbcrg. ran into the three children.
Kesler owns and operates a repair shop in this vicinity. He
had done the repair work on Mrs. Rodberg's automobile for
the past hvo y('ars (335). On the afternoon in question, Mrs.
Rodhcrg took her automobile to Kesler's garage because she had
~ "miss" in tht'· engine (329). Kesler came out in front of his
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shop where the car was parked, listened to the engine, lifted up
the hood of the automobile, tightened a wire and the engine
seemed to run better. However, he said, (330):
"Well, I'll run it around the block and ~see if it runs better
now." So Kesler got into the automobile, while Mrs. Rodberg
waited by herself in front of the garage. Seeing Mrs. Rodberg
standing there, Kesler then said,
"You might as well ride around with me ·and see how it runs."
Whereupon, Mrs. Rodberg went around to the right side, got into
the automobile, taking the seat beside Mr. Kesler, who was
driving. Since this was the normal course of dealing that Mrs.
Rodberg had had with Kesler for more than two years, there was
no discussion of a specific contract for repairs.
Mter Kesler had driven approximately one mile, during
which time he stopped and started the auto and used the brakes
on two or more occasions, and slowed the automobile down and
speeded it up, in order to road test it, the accident referred to
occurred (331, 332).
Kesler admitted that he did not need Mrs. Rodberg in the
automobile to tell him when the engine was ..missing" but stated
that (by her being present) "She can give me the idea on it"
(406, 407). Mrs. Rodberg is a seamstress, 55 years of age, with 35
years driving experience, who drives to and from work each
day and takes an occasional trip in her automobile (328, 361).
She testified that she was not familiar with the mechanical operation of an automobile, and that she was ..glad that I had
found Mr. Kesler, somebody that I felt I could depend on" to
keep her automobile in good repair (342).
When Mr. Kesler decided to road test the car, Mrs. Rodberg
planned to await his return and she, as owner, at that time relinquished all right of control of the automobile to him. He
subsequently invited her to ride with him while he tested it,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

becoming, in effect, his guest. Mrs. Rodberg's presence in the
auto was fortuitous, and the result of a last minute impulse by
Kesler to have her accompany him.
Mrs. Rodberg testified that Kesler could stop the auto and
get out, if he so desired, during any part of this road test (350).
There is no testimony that shows Kesler was subject to the
control and direction of Mrs. Rodberg at any time {348).
Testimony was given at the trial that the late afternoon sun
might have obscured Kesler's vision as he drove west on Burton
Avenue (416).
Mrs. Rodberg stated that when she saw the three infant
children walk out into the road, paying no attention to the approaching auto, that she screamed to Kesler to "Watch out for
the children". Further, that «he looked around and, you know,
I guess he was trying to find them, to see what I was hollering
about, I don't know. But he looked around for a minute first,
and then he applied the brakes" (341, 342).

'D

Defendant Kesler went to great lengths at the trial to contend that defective brakes on the Rodberg automobile, at the
time of the accident, were the sole cause of the injuries to the
children. However, the testimony of other wimesses of Kesler's
comments, made by him shortly after the accident, indicate that
he simply did not see the three infant children in time to stop,
irregardless of the condition of the brakes on the automobile.

;~-·

Officer Laub, who investigated the mishap minutes after it
oocurrcd, stated on direct examination that when he asked Defendant Kesler what had happened, that Kesler said:
'"The light was in my eyes. The sunlight was in my eyes and
I couldn't see them". It was only afterward, when Officer Laub
asked Kesler how he had attempted to stop that Kesler stated
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he had "hit" the brakes and that he had had to pump them twice
to get them to hold. He did not state that defective brakes were
the cause of the accident (142).
On cross-examination, Officer Laub again testified concerning Kesler's explanation of the accident as follows:
"I think he stated that the sun was in his eyes and that he
didn't see them, and he said that when Mrs. Rodberg called
out to him he then put his foot, he then hit the brakes" (152).
Mr. Faircloth, an eye witness to the accident, testified on
direct examination that, right after the accident, Kesler jumped
out of the auto and started up onto the lawn and said, "Oh,
Lord, I didn't see them" (162).
In neither instance did Kesler exclaim that the brakes
wouldn't hold nor that the auto had struck the children because
of defective brakes.
Mr. Max Morley, father of the two Morley children who
were injured, testified that he arrived home shortly after the
children were injured and that when he asked Kesler how the
accident ocourred, Kesler replied:
"I didn't see them. I just couldn't stop," and he repeated it
several times (206).
Alfred Leon, father of the Leon child who was injured testified that Kesler came to visit him two or three days after the accident. On re-direct examination, when asked what was said by
Kesler, Leon replied: "Well, he came over to tell us that he was
sorry that he had hit the 'little girl, but that he didn't see them.
He says the only thing he remembers is trying to stop and the
next thing he knew he seen the kids fly all over" (188).
On recross examination, Mr. Leon reiterated that he definitely remembered that Kesler said, during that visit to the Leon
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home, that he, Kesler, did not see the children. Further, that this
was aH he remembered Kesler saying during the visit (189).
The same Mr. Morley, who is a mechanic also, and who
advised the court that he was an expert on brakes stated that
brakes, such as were on Mrs. Rodberg's automobile, would have
braking power if the pedal could be pushed to within one inch
of the floor, although the power might not be fully effective,
but added, after being questioned by the court further concerning effective braking pressure that there would be braking pressure in such an instance, but not complete (210, 211).
~h.

Beecher, who as Kesler's witness, testified as an expert
on brakes, and who explained several hypothetical cases of
brages, presumed to be similar to those on the Rodberg auto,
stated on direct examination:
..Brakes such as this probably wouldn't bother the driver for
nonnal driving. He probably wouldn't know the difference. In
normal ·stops, the brakes aren't called upon to do much work.
TI1at is, stops that we encounter in our daily driving. Very
seldom, at least very seldom should we have to make an emergency stop and there is a decided difference in th amount of
energ~' a set of brakes must dissipate in making an emergency
stop and in making a controlled stop. A controlled stop would
be like stopping for a red light, or stopping for another car
stopped close in front of us. These brakes, I would judge, may
be adequate under those conditions, and probably would be.
The driver would notice no change in pedal, the brakes could
he adjusted adequately to give a full brake pedal and under
normal braking operations, would not notice any problem at all
in stopping the car ... " I would say that these brakes could act
normal under no11nal driving and under normal control fast
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stops but under an emergency stop they could show up as faulty
brakes" ('428, 429).
When asked whether anyone driving a car with brakes like
those on the Rodberg auto should have known that there was
some defect from the operation of the brakes, or with reasonable
observation and knowledge about braking and braking conditions could have ascertained that there was something wrong,
Mr. Beecher said:
"I would question it. In fact I would be willing to say that
many cars are on our highways right now with brakes just like
this and the drivers don't know it ..." (429).
The same witness, when asked if these defects on the brakes
would have been apparent if anyone had inspected the car to
examine the brakes to see if they were all right, stated that such
defects would nat have been apparent without removing the
wheels (431). He added that only an adjustment of the brakes
would show any defects, and that "None of the defects that I
have mentioned here would be shown by brake pedal position" (432).
Mrs. Rodberg testified that, approximately an hour after
the accident, Mr. Kesler, accompanied by Mrs. Rodberg, used
her auto to take her from the scene of the accident to her home,
and that she then drove him on to his place (339). Nothing
seemed wrong with the brakes at that time (364). Kesler testified that, four days following the accident, the engine on Mrs.
Rodberg's automobile wouldn't run, and that he repaired it for
her (387). Mr. Kesler stated that on October 1st, 17 days after
the accident, the engine on her auto quit again. After the repair
work was finished on the engine (389, 390), Mr. Kesler checked
the brakes extensively and notified Mrs. Rodberg that they
should be repaired. Thi>s was the first notice Mrs. Rodberg had
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from her garageman that the brakes needed repairs. The court
pointed out that this was more than two weeks after the accident and, because of the time element, it was not relevant to the
aocident of September 14 (374, 375).
~hs.

Winnie M. Lambert, a fellow employee of Mrs. Rodberg's, rode to and hom work with Mrs. Rodberg for several
months immediately prior to the mishap of September. She
testified that on two occasions, between September 4th and September 14th, 1956, while en route with Mrs. Rodberg in her
auto, to or from work two emergency situations arose, in traffic,
which required \Irs. Rodberg to stop her auto very suddenly,
and that she had done so with no apparent difficulty (369).
~Irs. Colleen Hammill, \1rs. Rodberg's daughter, testified
that she had driven her mother's auto ..15 or 20 times" in the
months preceding the accident of September 14, and that she
had never had any h·ouble with the brakes on the automobile
(365).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
A. GARAGE 0\V~ER .\ND OPERATOR, ~IR. KESLER,
IN DRIVING AND TESTING MRS. RODBERG'S CAR WAS
AN INDEPENDENT CONTACTOR AS A \lATTER OF LAW
AND NOT THE AGENT OF \IRS. RODBERG.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT \IRS. RODBERG \V.\S NOT NEGLIGENT IN ANY MANNER \VHATSOEVER.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A GARAGE OWNER AND OPERATOR, MR. KESLER,
IN DRIVING AND TESTING MRS. RODBERG'S CAR WAS
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AN INDEPENDENT CONTACTOR AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND NOT THE AGENT OF MRS. RODBE'RG.
Plaintiffs complain that the court's refusal to give their requested Instruction No. 6 was error. Thi,s complaint is illfounded. The court's refusal to give such requested instruction
was proper. In fact, the instruction is not a proper statement of
the law and it would have been reversible error for the court to
give such instruction.

PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 (60)
''The acts and omissions of an agent are, in contemplation of law, the acts and omiss:i:ons of his principal.
"In this connection, you are instructed that since

the defendant Rodberg was the owner of the automobile
and an occupant in said automobile, she is legally responsible for any negligent acts or omissions by the defendant, Kesler. As a result, if you should find Kesler
responsible to plaintiffs in accordance with these instructions, you must also find Rodberg responsible to
plaintiffs and assess damages against both Kesler and
Rodberg jointly, in accordance with these instructions."
The portion of the requested instruction that is in italics
shows that part of the instruction which is not the law of the
State of Utah nor of most other states. Such does not comply
with Fox v. Lavender, 56 P. 2d 1049, 89 Utah 115, 109 A.L.R.
105, cited by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' own citation from the case
shows that the strongest law in Utah, as set out in the Fox case,
is merely a presumption of agency. However, the Fox case explains the presumptions mentioned therein as being "rebuttable"
presumptions, and ~states that:
". . . the burden of proving t:he ultimate fact of
agency remains throughout with the plaintiff, ... "

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
Most of the cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their
argument, that the mere presence of an automobile owner in the
car being driven by another, as a matter of law, makes the owner
the principal of the operator, are cases which do not support
their contention. Take for example the first two cases cited by
plaintiffs after Fox v. Lavender, supra. Anderson v. Hardman,
313 P. 2d 459, 6 Utah 2d. 305. In this case the question of agency
was submitted to and determined by a jury, and the court said at
page 308 of 6 Utah 2d,
"We think the verdict and judgment are fully supported by the evidence."
This case did not consider the question a matter of law.

Bell v. Jacobs (Pa.) 104 A. 587 is another case where the
question of agency was submitted to the jury for determination and does not appear from the case nor the facts stated
therein to have been considered by the Pennsylvania court
as a matter of Jaw. In fact there appears no contention in
either case that the driver of the car was an independent contractor.
In the instant case it appears from the evidence that Kesler
was the owner and operator of a garage. He was not an employee of the garage as appears in most cases that have gone
hefore the courts. There can be no question but what Kesler, as
a garage owner and operator, was an independent contractor
and remained such while out testing the automobile of a customer who had been going to him for automobile repair services
for more than two years. The most that could be said in plaintiffs' favor is that there was a presumption that Kesler remained
an independent contractor during the test of the automobile.
This then would make two conflicting presumptions:
First: A presumption that the garage owner and operator
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was presumed to remain in control of the automobile he was
testing throughout the test.
Second: The presumption which plaintiffs have argued in
their brief, that Kesler was Mrs. Rodberg's agent.
Under such circumstances the procedure most favorable to
the plaintiffs would have been the procedure followed by the
court to submit the question of agency to the jury. If the question of agency or independent contractor should have been submitted to a jury, it was submitted here under proper instructions.
However, the garage owner and operator was an independent contractor as a matter of law, and the ins·tructions to
the jury should have so stated.
In Zeeb v. Bahnmaier 103 Kan. 599, 176 P. 326, 2 A.L.R.
883, a case in which the owner of an automobile was riding
with his son who was driving the automobile, the court said,
"Unless some rational theory of principal and agent,
or of master and servant, supported by substantial evidence, can connect the father with the act or delict of
the son, the father is no more liable than a stranger.
And this principle holds true whether the father is present or absent when the tort of the son is committed."
In Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 130 N.W. 336, 33 LRA
NS 81, the owner af a car was sitting beside the ·driver, the
driver had borrowed the car and was in complete control, the
court gave a directed verdict in favor of the owner, and plaintiff
appealed. The appellate court affirmed the directed verdict in
favor of the owner in stating that an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality, and that under such circumstances there
was no agency. In other words, the court held as a matter of
law the driver was not the owner's agent merely because of the
presence of the owner.
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The facts in the case before the court show conclusively
that Kesler, the garage owner and operator, was in control of
the car and Mrs. Rodberg, the owner, was an invited guest to
go along with him at his own suggestion. When he took the
car out to test it he invited Mrs. Rodberg to go with him (348,
349).
In Menge v. Manthey, 227 N.W. 938, 200 Wis. 485, a garageman took full charge of moving a wrecked car while the owner
was present. It was held the garageman was an independent
contractor and that damage caused by accident in moving the
car was the garageman's liability and not the owner's.

Fox v. Lavender, 56 P. 2d 1049, 89 Utah 115, 109 A.L.R. 105
supports the contention of Mrs. Rodberg that mere ownership
and presence in the car being driven by another, is not sufficient,
as a matter of law, to hold the owner liable.
In support of Mrs. Rodberg's contention that the cause of
this accident was the failuTe of Kesler to keep a proper lookout,
and to drive more carefully under the existing conditions, ~Irs.
Rodberg refers to Officer Laub's testimony (143) that Kesler
advised him shortly after the accident that he did not see the
children until 1\lrs. RodbeTg called out to hin1. Kesler testified
(38-!) that the sun bothered him, and he lowered the sun visor (as
he turned west onto Burton AYenue from Third East Street).
Officl'r Laub testified (151) that all four wheels on the Rodberg car, according to the skid marks on the street, "braked"
,,·hen Kesler engaged the brakes in an effort to stop. Officer
Lanb, when asked b~· the court (156, 157), testified that when he
l<~stcd the brakes on the Rodberg automobile soon ·after the accident, that the pedal took ho1d for him on the first application.
He rcitc~rated this on being further questioned by the court.
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Plaintiffs, in their brief, claim, without qualification, that
Kesler was driving too fast and that the brakes on Mrs. Rodberg's auto were defective at the time of the accident. The record indicates that this statement is clearly erroneous, as is pointed out immediately below and also on pages 6, 12, 16 and 17 of
this brief.
Officer Laub stated (154) that the posted speed 'limit for
Burton Avenue, at the stte of the accident, was 25 miles per hour.
Both Mrs. Rodberg and Kesler testified that the speed o:f
the Rodberg auto immediately prior to the accident was 20-25
miles per hour (352, 398).
Mr. Beecher, the brake expert, made some statements concerning the ,skid mark distances at certain given speeds of an
auto. He stated that, at 20 miles per hour, the skid mark distance
would be 20 feet; that at 40 miles per hour, the skid mark distance would be 80-82 feet (424); that at 30 miles per hour, the
skid marks would be 45 feet (432). The evidence given by
Officer Laub and Mr. Kesler was that the skid marks of Mrs.
Rodberg's auto in the instant case measured 41 feet, 6 inches.
The following cases support the contentions of Mrs. Rodberg:

1. That Instruction No. 6 requested by plaintiffs is clearly
erroneous and is not a correct statement of law. Accordingly
was properly refused by the court;
2. That to hold an owner-occupant of an auto liable for
the negligence of the driver, plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the owner-occupant:
(a)

Had authority to control or direct the negligent
driver, or
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(b)

Was actively engaged in the control and direction of the driving of .such auto.

In Davis v. Spindler (1952) Nebraska, 56 N.W. 2d. 107, the
court stated:

'Where the owner as a matter of law is shown to
be a guest therein, in the absence of evidence of retention or assumption of any right of control over the driver,
the contributory negligence of the latter will not be imputed to the owner in an action to recover for his wrongful death against a third person."
In Schweidler v. Caruso (1955) Wisconsin, 69 N.W. 2d. 611,
the owner sought damages against a third person as wen as the
driver. The owner and a friend had started on a fishing trip
together. The court considered that while ordinarily the ownership of an auto may raise a presumption sufficient to justify an
inference that the driver was the owner's agent, yet an owner
may be a guest in his own auto. 1be court held there was no
joint enterprise nor an agency relationship but rather a bailorbailee relation.
In Masanz v. Farmers Mutual AutOTTWbile Insurance Co.
(1949) \Visconsin, 40 N.\V. 2nd. 391, the owner-occupant of

~:

a car, returning from a dance had asked a friend to do the
driving before the accident occurred. The court held the owner
had not assumed the risk of the driver ·s negligence where it
was not of such duration that the owner \vas bound either to
oh,crvc it, and act for his own protection, or to assume any
ri<sk.
In Peterson v. Schneider (1951) Nebraska, 47 N.\\~. 2d. 863,
the owner and two others were on a hunting trip and each drove
a part of the time, pursuant to an arrangement of convience. The
court held that where there was no evidence that the occupants

~:l:
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were on a joint enterprise or that any relationship existed between the owner and the driver which gave the owner authority
to direct or aSJSist in the operation and management of the car,
the driver's contributory negligence will not be imputed to the

owner-occupant.
In Archer v. Aristocrat Ice Cream Company (1953) Georgia
74 S.E. 2d. 470, the co~owner, a deputy sheriff, was present in
an automobile which the sheriff was driving. The court held that
the driver was in complete control of its operation and the court
held that the driver's negligence was not imputable to the deputy
in an action against a third person.
In Caldwell v. Miller (1943) California 141 P. 2d 745, the
owner-occupant and the driver of the automobile were accompanied by girls in search of amusement when the accident occurred. The court held the driver was not acting as the owner's
"agent" so as to render the owner liable for the girls' injuries
resulting from an accident caused by the driver.
In Fox v. Kannisky (1942) Wisconsin, 2 N.W. 2d. 199, the
wife, who was the owner-occupant was permitted to recover
from a third person for injuries sustained upon proof that she
had relinquished all right of control of the automobile to her
husband who was driving.

POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT, MRS. RODBERG, WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER.
The evidence is overwhelming that the sole proximate cause
of plaintiffs' injuries was because Kesler drove into a bright
sunlight without being able to see what was in the street in
front of him.
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An eyewitness, Faircloth (162, 163, 167, 168, 174), Mrs.
Rodberg (341, 342, 356) and Kesler himself (384), all testified
concerning the bright glare of the afternoon sunlight into which
Kesler drove Mrs. Rodberg's auto, turning from south (on Third
East) to a west direction (on Burton Ave.) while being, at the
same time, primarily concerned with the road test which he, Kesler, was making with Mrs. Rodberg's auto. Leon and Morley
testified (188, 189, 206) Kesler said he did not 3ee the children.
Officer Laub (152) a:lso testified that Kesler told him the
same thing, concerning the sunlight, and not seeing the children,
which the other witnesses testified to.
The court has continually emphasized the duty imposed by
law upon a driver to see what is in front of him for the protection, health and safety of both himself and others. Baker v.
Savas, 172 P. 072, 52 U. 262; Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 272 P. 207,
73 U. 1; Van Cleave v. Lynch, 166 P. 2d 244, 109 U. 149, Spackman v. Carson, 216 P. 2d 640, 117 U. 390, Covington,-. Carpenter, 294 P. 2d 788, 4 U. 2d 378, Fretz v. Anderson, 300 P. 2d 642,
5 U. 2d 290, Robison v. Willden, 310 P. 2d 521, 6 U. 2d 231.
Plaintiffs complain that the oondition of the brakes did not
comply with the statute. There is no evidence whatsoever for
such contention.
Officer Laub (140) further testified there were alternately
heavy, light, and heavy brake bums of a distance of 41 feet, 6
inches which were «All connected and definitely a part of the
brake skid marks "·hich were left by the Yehicle at this time"
(the time of the accident).
Mr. Beecher testified (433) that the braking distance of an
auto, once the brakes locked, would be the same whether it had
good brakes or poor brakes. Al.so that a person having an auto
with the type of brakes found on the Rodberg auto (two weeks
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after the accident) may have no notice of the condition of the
brakes, and certainly not under normal driving conditions (405,

421, 436).
In addition to Defendant Rodberg's objections, the court
(374, 375), twice commented that the condition of the brakes (two
weeks after the accident) were not relevant to the time of the
accident, but permitted the testimony to go in.
All of the foregoing oonclusively show that there is no evidence of improper brake functioning on the Rodberg car at the
time of the accident; that there is no evidence that Mrs. Rodberg
knew or should have known of any improper condition of the
brakes. Further, there is no evidence that the condition of the
brakes p:mximately caused or contributed to any of the injuries
complained of by plaintiffs. In fact, all of the conduct of Mrs.
Rodberg and the condition of the brakes on her auto come within
the orbit of Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986.
There is nothing appearing in the evidence indicating any
negligence whatsoever on the part of Mr,s. Rodberg. Despite
the fact there is no evidence indicating that Mrs. Rodberg might
have been negligent in regard to the brakes, the court submitted the question to the jury with great over-emphasis upon
the question of brakes.
In Instruction No. 4 (34) the court said:
"You are likewise instructed that it was Kesler's
duty, and that of the other defendant, Rodberg, to operate an automobile that had brakes that were in such
condition tha:t they were reasonably safe for the operation of said automobile and if you find that either of
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the defendants knew, or should have known, of any defective and unsafe condition of said brakes and that they
operated the automobile thereafter, when said brakes
were not reasonably safe for the operation of said automobile under the circumstances, then such operation
would be negligent."
In Instruction No. 5 (36) the court said:
"You are, however, instructed that if you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Rodberg had
defective brakes and that she knew of the same, or with
the exercise of rasonable diligence could have ascertained such fact, then she could be responsible to the
plaintiffs without showing any relationship of principal
and agent between her and Kesler."
In Instruction No. 7 (39 and 40) the court said:
«You are instructed that if you find from all the evidence that defendant Kesler acted as a reasonable prudent man would have acted under similar circumstances
and if you find that the 1947 Pontiac owned by the defendant Elberteen Rodberg had defective brakes and
that the defective brakes contributed to proximately
cause the alleged injury and damages to the plaintiffs
and that the defendant Rodberg knew, should have
known, or with reasonable inspection could ha\'e ascertained the defective brake condition and failed to correct and repair the same and failed to advise defendant
Kesler of said condition, he being ignorant of their condition, then you must assess damages, if any, against
tlw defendant Rodberg only and not against defendant
Kesler.
If, on the other hand, you find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant Kesler knew, or in
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the exercise of reasonable care should have ascertained,
that said brakes were defective and he ~continued to
operate the automobile under such conditions and the
defective condition of the brakes was the proximate
cause of his inability to stop the automobile, if such you
find to be the fact, then you would find that the defendant Kesler was negligent and your verdict in such
instance should be against him and in favor of the plaintiffs.
You are further instructed that if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that both Mrs. Rodberg
and Kesler knew of the defective condition of the brakes,
or in the exercise of reasonable care 'they could have ascertaind that said brakes were defective and that they
continued to operate the automobile under such conditions, and if you find that the defective condition of
the brakes was the proximate cause of the happening of
the incident in question, then and under those circumstances your verdict would be in favor of the plaintiffs
and against both defendants."
These instructions are more favorable to the plaintiff's than
should have been allowed. Under such circumstances plaintiffs
have nothing to complain of in regard to the decision of the
jury in behalf of Mrs. Rodberg. White v. Pinney 108 P. 2d 249,
99

u.

484.

CONOLUSION
We respectfully submit that under the facts of the case the
court should have determined as a matter of law that Kesler
was an independent contractor, that Mrs. Rodberg was not liable
for any of the damages arising out of the accident, that the damages and injuries arising from the accident occurred solely be-
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cause o£ the negligence of the defendant Kesler. That in any
event, the instructions requested by plaintiffs, which were refused, were not correct statements of the law. The instructions,
as given by the court, actually favored plaintiffs over Mrs. Rodberg. The dedsion of the jury should be affirmed.
Respectively Submitted,
DAVIS and BAYLES

Counsel for Respondent
53 East 4th South St.,
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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